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FROM THEORY AND RESEARCH TO POLICY AND PRACTICE 
IN WORK AND EMPLOYMENT — AND BEYOND? 
Harry Arthurs 
York University 
Remarks to the 
Canadian Industrial Relations Association 
50th Anniversary Conference 
Toronto  29 May 2013 
The title of  CIRA’s 50th anniversary conference — From Theory and Research to Policy 
and Practice in Work and Employment — has a nostalgic ring to it.   It makes us all think 
about “the good old days”.  You’ll recall, perhaps,  that  large numbers of people, who 
used to be known as “workers”,  were “employed”  in something called “industry”. 
Significant numbers of these workers  joined organizations called “unions” that 
established collective “relations” with employers.  Implausible as it now seems,  
governments were once so concerned about “industrial relations” that they sponsored a 
great deal of  IR research and even conducted their own.   Moreover —  I’m not making 
this up! — research  sometimes led to reforms that were embedded in public “policy” or 
law.  And though this sounds utterly improbable,  some laws and policies based on 
research actually made things better in “practice”.    Or so it seemed  in the good old 
days.  
This quaint  approach was epitomized by the work of the federal Task Force on  Labour 
Relations, chaired by CIRA’s first president, Buzz Woods of McGill.  The  Task Force, 
appointed in 1966, enlisted virtually every industrial relations and labour law scholar in 
the country; compiled shelves-full of ambitious studies; and made scores of 
recommendations,  a surprising number of which ended up being adopted by  one or 
another Canadian jurisdiction.    Moreover, the era of the Woods Task Force coincided, 
more or less, with  a series of broad policy developments  with IR implications including: 
the introduction of medicare, the Canada Pension Plan and other  social welfare 
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programs, the expansion of post-secondary education,  negotiation  of the auto pact and 
adoption of other interventionist public policies designed to create jobs and enhance 
productivity.  And finally, that same period saw  numerous  improvements in corporate 
HR practices including the emergence of highly  structured internal labour markets, 
increased job security, and more widespread provision of employment-related benefits 
such as DB pensions and annual vacations.     This was heady stuff for IR scholars who 
not only advocated  progressive public policies,  but also served  as architects and 
administrators of progressive regulatory regimes, and proffered advice on progressive 
workplace practices.  We believed  that our research, our analysis, was changing the 
world.    
 
But we were wrong.  We  under-estimated the historical contingency of the  IR system 
within which we were working.  That system was shaped initially by  memories  of the 
Great Depression, by the experience of wartime  mobilization, by  morale-raising 
slogans about democracy and  freedom from want, and subsequently by the unique  
political economy of the postwar period:  Keynesian economic policies, the expansion of 
manufacturing in response to pent-up consumer demand,  the cold war contest for the 
hearts and minds of workers,  and the optimism engendered by two or three decades of 
a baby boom, relatively low unemployment, rising living standards and the fairer 
distribution of social goods.  However, when the force  of those unusual historical 
circumstances was spent,  the IR policies and practices they had enabled entered a 
long period of disruption and decline.    
 
To remind you of  some  painful details:   
 
• The  Canadian labour market became polarized into “good” and “bad” jobs, 
secure and precarious jobs. 
• Average wages  flat-lined over  considerable periods of time; average job tenure 
shrank;  pension coverage declined;  and labour laws came to protect  a 
shrinking percentage of the workforce. 
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• Public interest in, knowledge of and sympathy for  workers’ issues  diminished, 
while  employer attitudes and government  actions towards unions   hardened.   
• Union density, economic power and political influence all shrivelled.   
• The  social safety net — including both  elements provided by the state and 
those provided by employers — developed gaping holes.   
• And in general,  various fiscal, trade, economic and social policies  were adopted 
that effectively repudiated the values and undermined the arrangements  on 
which Canada’s postwar industrial relations  systems  were built.   
 
This is a rather glum reprise of recent IR history,  so in the interests of both accuracy 
and audience morale,  I’m prepared to add three caveats: 
 
First caveat: there were positive developments as well as negative ones: 
 
• Obviously, labour markets produced  winners as well as losers. 
• Average household incomes did  not  track average wages downwards, partly 
because there are more two-income households,  partly because of income 
supports for specific population cohorts.  
• Some new public policies and employer practices — especially  those relating to 
workplace discrimination and harassment —  benefited important  constituencies 
of Canadian workers, such as women, racial minorities and people with 
disabilities. 
• And for whatever it’s worth — not much, in my view — the Charter now formally 
entrenches some rights of workers including equality and  mobility rights, and 
freedom of assembly, association and expression.  
 
Second caveat:  the sorry state of Canadian industrial relations cannot be blamed 
entirely on  hostile employers and unsympathetic  governments: 
 
• To some extent, the postwar collective bargaining system failed because of flaws 
in the design of that system and in union structures and strategies.  
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• To a greater  extent, however,  labour’s waning industrial and political power 
reflects a sociological shift in workers’ primary identities,  in their sense of 
solidarity and in their inclination towards collective action.  
• And most importantly, the Canadian industrial relations system was destabilized  
by  exogenous developments — by a technological revolution, by globalization 
and by consequent fundamental changes in the architecture of capitalist 
economies.   
 
 And a third caveat:  though worker-employer relations and labour market outcomes  
have become increasingly dire, IR research  has actually  become pretty impressive.  
Not to overstate, but the people in this room  can scrutinize complex and obscure 
workplace phenomena with x-ray vision;  they  can leap national and disciplinary 
borders in a single bound; they can engage with emerging policy domains and 
employment practices faster than a speeding bullet.  I’m not sure what metrics one 
would use to measure improvements in IR research over the past 50 years but — if you 
define the term broadly—  there’s clearly more of it today and it’s of better quality.    
  
So: if  IR is getting worse and IR research is getting better,  we have to ask: “what’s the 
relationship between the two?”   Or to rephrase the question: “does this mean that IR 
research is having less  impact on policy and practice than it used to?”   
 
I want to answer that question in several ways.  The first is to revisit my  earlier 
suggestion  that  the sixties were the  “good old days” of IR research, that  governments 
back then embraced  relatively  progressive  industrial relations and social policies and 
that employers  adopted somewhat more enlightened  HR practices.  Those things were 
all more-or-less true, but  perhaps  they weren’t causally related.  Perhaps there were 
reasons other than good research that produced improvements in policy and practice.     
Remember:  union density was  higher in the 1960s;  strikes were much more frequent;  
and labour’s  political leverage and social influence were on the rise.  Isn’t it likely, then, 
that  governments adopted progressive IR policies not  because  the Woods Report 
showed them a “better way” but in order to dampen down  labour militancy at the polls 
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and on picket lines?  Isn’t it likely that employers introduced  more enlightened 
workplace  practices not because they read our learned publications but  because they 
wanted to  deflect or de-radicalize unionization or projects of statutory regulation?  As 
proof of this hypothesis,  I’ll just observe that now that times have changed, now that 
unions are in steep decline, neither governments nor  employers have any reason to 
persevere with the relatively  progressive policies they once embraced.    So they don’t. 
 
My second answer is a bit different.  In a 2007  article,  Morley Gunderson asked under 
what conditions  IR research is likely to influence public policy.     Apart from the quality 
of the research and the reputation of the researcher,  he concluded,  “timeliness” and 
“political acceptability” are  key predictors of success.  In other words, it isn’t that 
research has no influence;   it does —  but  only when researchers make 
recommendations that square with the  government’s ideological predilections or 
political  imperatives.   To revisit my analysis of the sixties,  IR scholars generally 
adopted a  “social justice”  perspective.  This is  hardly surprising: from its inception as a  
discipline, IR was closely associated with the British Fabians and the American 
Progressive movement.  The ultimate point of labour law and policy, most of us 
believed,  was to ensure that workers were treated fairly.  Fairness could be achieved in  
several ways:  by legislating  fair labour standards; by  facilitating the aggregation of  
countervailing power and promoting collective bargaining;  by having the state buffer 
workers against  the  consequences of unemployment, illness and old age; even by 
persuading employers to harken to their better angels.  But fairness was the end in 
view. We were all “progressives” then.     
 
In the postwar period, from 1945 right through the 1960s,  this view of IR still had some 
traction.  It was, in Morley’s terms, “timely” and “politically acceptable”.  However, by  
the1970s we had entered what the historian, Daniel Rogers, calls “the age of fracture”  
— a period of  radical transformation  in our thinking about  markets, power, race and 
gender  and about  IR policies and  practices that are rooted in that thinking.   Research 
that is  “timely” or “politically acceptable”  today —post-rupture— valorizes markets and 
promotes greater entrepreneurial freedom, less regulation and a reduced safety net.   
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Please don’t misunderstand me.  My concern is not that such research  has had  more 
influence than  its scholarly merit warrants.  On the contrary,  it is often highly 
sophisticated.  Rather I am making the same point that Morley did: scholarly merits 
aside, IR research can be highly influential, precisely because it tells  employer-friendly  
governments  and worker-unfriendly employers just  what they want to hear.       
  
Of course governments would generally prefer to hear nothing at all about industrial 
relations.   Many of them have disbanded their  labour ministries or parked them under 
the umbrella of larger ministries concerned with economic growth or social welfare.  As 
a result,  labour policy often emerges as  a by-product of fiscal,  monetary,  trade or  
welfare policy.  Worse yet,  governments are able to do this because no one seems to 
care.  Few, if any, newspapers have a labour reporter; labour issues have  virtually 
disappeared from popular culture and public consciousness;  and workers have ceased 
to think of themselves in terms of their class identity.      
 
Now let me expand Morley’s thesis.  IR research  is likely to be influential, I’m going to 
argue, not  only when it is politically acceptable, but also when it is intellectually 
fashionable .  Intellectual fashions in our discipline have changed considerably since the 
1960s.   As a study of IR research reported in 2000, there has been a decided shift from 
“inductive, qualitative and policy-oriented research” to “deductive, quantitative and 
discipline-oriented research”.  There are reasons for that shift, which have  to do both 
with ideology and  with intellectual trends.  However, I want to focus on consequences 
rather than causes.  People who do “discipline-oriented” research — whether their 
discipline is  macro-economics, gender studies  or  constitutional law — have brought 
energy, breadth and  depth to IR scholarship.  However they tend, naturally enough, to 
deploy  theories and methodologies associated with their “home” discipline, and to 
measure  their academic legitimacy according to  that discipline’s  particular metrics.   
The  result has been to shift the centre of gravity of IR scholarship and to diffuse  its 
focus.   Two examples.  Mainstream economists writing about labour issues are likely  
to generate models designed to demonstrate how  efficient outcomes are achieved in  
hypothetical markets.  They are unlikely to adopt the older approach of  IR scholars, 
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who typically dealt with granular or impressionistic data, who were  wary of models and 
who sought to undo or modify  market outcomes, not replicate or reinforce them.  
Second example:  Charter scholars writing on workers’ “rights” are likely to adopt the 
binary analysis  of jurists — rights exist or not; they are respected or not.  And they are  
likely to focus more on the formal outcome of individual  cases than on their actual 
impact on relationships  and systems.  This is in sharp contrast to the traditional 
tolerance of IR scholars  for conflict and ambiguity, and their search for equilibrium and 
compromise.   In short because discipline-focussed IR scholars naturally tend to adopt  
the conventional wisdom of their home disciplines and to  speak in  their distinctive 
vernaculars, they often  end up  at right angles to  the assumptions,  values and 
discourses that once characterized  much of IR research.      
 
This  shift to “discipline-oriented” research  signals not merely a natural evolution in 
scholarly theorizing and methodology.  It stems from and reinforces a significant trend  
towards embedding IR units within business schools,  re-branding  them as 
departments or research centres  concerned with Human Resources Management 
(HRM),  Personnel Management (PM) or Organizational Behaviour (OB).  Over time, in  
this new institutional context,  and as personnel change, scholars in the field  are likely 
to attenuate or abandon their  ties to   the “old” IR discipline,  acquire a different  cohort 
of “significant others”,   proceed from a different set of implicit assumptions about  
employment relations and labour markets, identify different priorities for research and 
different venues for publication and, for all these reasons,  gradually infuse their work 
with a different, business-friendly  ideology.   To be sure, a countervailing trend has also 
developed:  to re-constitute  IR programs under the generic rubric  of  Work and Labour 
Studies (a new Canadian learned society has adopted that title) in which both  pluralist 
and critical analyses of IR issues can find a place; but this is a more modest trend.  
 
To sum up my argument  crudely but succinctly:  IR research inevitably has an 
ideological tendency;  it is most likely to be influential when that tendency aligns with the 
dominant social and political forces of the time.  And IR research   has  a disciplinary 
pedigree or provenance;  it is most likely to be accorded academic respect when it  
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faithfully conforms to the expectations and conventions of its discipline of origin.   So if 
we’re looking to influence government  policy or corporate practice, if we’re looking to 
make ourselves useful as practitioners or consultants, if we’re looking to make our fame 
and fortune in our  “home” disciplines,  we know what to do.  We  must abandon the old 
“progressive” tendency in IR research,  find a way to ingratiate ourselves with influential 
people in ministries such as Trade or Finance, and hone our skills as macro-economists 
or  constitutional lawyers.     
 
But let’s remember where we stand at this moment in history.  Global capitalism is in 
considerable disarray.  If Standard & Poor were to give the capitalist system an honest 
rating  (something we shouldn’t take for granted) it would be BB or lower.  Markets and 
economies are in trouble; companies and governments are in trouble; transnational and 
national institutions are in trouble; IR systems are in trouble; disciplines like ours are in 
trouble.  They’re all in trouble because they can’t, won’t or don’t offer any way forward 
except the same  approaches that brought us to our present difficulties.   
 
Worst of all, people are in trouble.  Conditions have been deteriorating for some time 
now for employed workers in most developed economies in all the ways I mentioned 
earlier.  But remember: they have been  deteriorating as well for a long list of other 
people:  for young people and members of  marginalized communities who can find only 
precarious  employment or  none at all;  for older people who can’t afford to retire or 
have been  forced out of the labour  market  with no prospects of re-entry or of proper 
pensions;  for  people who  have maxed out their credit cards or are behind on their 
mortgages or their rent; for self-employed people and those  who own farms or taxis  or 
franchised small businesses; for people in the informal economy or on the dole.     
 
Many  of these people have devised  short-term survival strategies within their local 
communities; but some have surrendered to despair; some have embraced xenophobic 
or authoritarian fantasies; and some have joined protest movements  like  the 
Indignants or Occupy Wall Street that, alas, have failed to propose coherent programs 
or to demonstrate that they have staying power.  The picture is not so different from 
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what it was in the 1890s or 1930s —  decades  marked by economic chaos, social 
turmoil and political unrest.   And remember: it  was chaos,  turmoil and  unrest that 
gave  practical purpose and moral imperative to  industrial relations not only as an 
academic discipline and as a profession but also as a plausible, if partial,  response to 
what used to be called “the social question”. 
 
So we are back where we started.  We can continue to provide research  that is “timely”, 
“politically acceptable” and intellectually fashionable,  research that demonstrates the 
inevitability and desirability of current  policy and practice, research — in other words — 
that is influential in the corridors of power.  Or as we once did, we can generate the kind 
of research that the historical moment requires: research that challenges,  research that 
tells inconvenient truths about policies and practices that aren’t working, research that  
exposes assumptions and structures that are entrenching inequality and legitimating 
social dysfunction, research that breaks  taboos about what is corporate “best practice” 
or “realistic” public policy, research that raises the normative questions that are often 
absent from  orthodox theorizing and dominant methodologies.  
 
While it would represent a clear break with present tendencies, I don’t think of that kind 
of research as “radical”, unless you think of   the Webbs or John R Commons or Buzz 
Woods as radicals.  I think of it as  the legitimate and necessary application of lessons 
learned  in a discipline that, after all, helped to invent and give institutional form  to 
collective bargaining, labour standards, social security,  professional HR management 
and  new techniques of dispute resolution.  Despite their shortcomings,  these IR 
inventions represent the most sustained and successful attempts  so far to  humanize  
capitalism without destroying it.    The people in this room are therefore almost uniquely 
equipped to provide states, social movements and corporations with what they most 
need: a sophisticated  analysis of social and economic relations, a repertoire of credible 
strategies to manage those relations and the technical know-how to translate those 
strategies into practice.      
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What I propose, then, is that we invest  our accumulated intellectual capital in 
addressing contemporary relationships that bear a striking resemblance  to the classical 
issues of industrial relations.   Stripped down to bare bones,  here are some of the 
insights of IR that may be generalizable:  
 
• Markets don’t automatically correct entrenched  asymmetries of wealth and 
power: they often  reinforce them — with fairly dire long-term social 
consequences.   Countervailing power, whether mobilized by the state or by 
social forces, is  necessary in order to  avoid those asymmetries or mitigate their 
results.   
• However, the decline of  postwar IR  regimes over the past four or five decades  
has taught us that the forces that shape, regulate and destabilize  such regimes  
are complex and  inter-connected.  Consequently, we have to learn to think about 
countervailing power in more general terms than we have been doing.  That’s 
why I stress the importance of thinking about all the people suffering in the 
present crisis, not just employed workers and about all the public policies and 
corporate practises that affect those people, not just policies and practices that 
fall within the traditional scope of our discipline.   
• If we broaden our “clientele” and the scope of our policy concerns,  we must also 
broaden the  mandate of our  discipline.   We should constitute ourselves as the 
vanguard of a new academic discipline that, for want of a better descriptor, I will 
call  the study of relations of economic power and  resistance.    
• We might begin that  broadening  process  by offering others access to our  
extensive  knowledge of how to  conceptualize, design and implement 
intervention in labour markets.  There are precedents for this.  IR scholars 
designed much of FDR’s National Industrial Recovery Act and its Canadian 
counterparts,  lent their expertise to the civil rights movement of the 1960s and to 
attempts to organize and empower welfare recipients,  contributed to the 
women’s movement and the environmental movement, and helped to shape the 
way we deal with  human rights complaints and create  fairer governance 
arrangements  for  aboriginal peoples.   Surely, if  we put our minds to it, we can 
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do the same for  tenants and  mortgagors, farmers and consumers, the  self-
employed  and small businesses.    
  
Obviously, there are concerns.    How credible is our learning and our advice, given that 
the IR system we created is in disarray?   How exportable are the lessons of IR given 
that one of those lessons is that systems of countervailing power  tend to be situation-
specific and time-limited?  Can any serious  resistance to economic power be tolerated 
in  a political economy that is deeply, almost constitutionally,  committed to the primacy 
of markets?  Can we replicate national systems of  labour market regulation in a global 
economy  that lacks  effective norm-generating or norm-enforcing institutions?   
 
These are legitimate questions to which I have only very general responses.   The first 
response is of course that we can learn from our failures as well as our successes:  not 
allowing disciplinary and mandate boundaries to circumscribe our analysis is perhaps 
the most important lesson we must learn.  The second is that I’m not proposing that we 
export anything except some very general ideas about how to overcome problems that 
are common to most systems of countervailing power.   The third is that I’m not 
proposing that we do away with markets — only that we acknowledge their negative 
effects  and work diligently to limit or eradicate those effects.  And finally, I’m not 
proposing that we  replicate anything;  I’m only saying that having several times 
invented or re-invented  a system of countervailing power, we know a thing or two about 
how to do that, even “without the state”, if needs be.    
 
And oh yes,  I have one more response to sceptics and to critics of the idea that IR can 
reinvent itself as the study of  economic power and resistance.   The IR community 
confronts two choices.  Choice one:  same-old, same-old.   We can keep  inventing  
clever ways  to  bring  old regimes of  workplace regulation into line  with new labour 
market realities;  we can continue to explain to  employers  why treating  workers with 
greater consideration and respect is in their own interest;  we can  persist with  
whispering sweet Charter nothings  in the ear of power  and hope that power  is in a 
mood to  be seduced.  I’m afraid that each of these strategies will turn out to be an 
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exercise in futility, though I suppose we’ll have to persevere with them for the time 
being, faut de mieux.   
 
Or choice two: we can search diligently for genuine alternatives to our present 
dysfunctional system.  We can accept that IR as a discipline and profession, as a 
distinct domain of  public policy and approach to class relations  has arrived in a cul de 
sac.  We’ve got here  partly because of exogenous circumstances, partly because of 
our own shortcomings.   But we are most definitely here.  Where do we go next?   
 
The first move,  as I’ve just suggested, is to shift our frame of reference, to make it more 
open-ended and inclusive: to re-invent ourselves as the Canadian Association for the 
Study of Economic Power and Resistance.  From that initial move,  a number of 
developments might follow.    First, we are likely to find ourselves engaged with a new 
group of colleagues whose  frame of reference differs from ours, though they deal with 
very similar questions.  Attempts to negotiate the  differences in our  intellectual 
traditions and in the historical experiences that frame up our discipline are likely to  
prove intellectually fruitful  for all parties.   Second,  we will have to address a broader, 
though related, set of  policy challenges.  At a moment when industrial relations seem to 
have reached an impasse,  these new challenges just might re-energize our  discipline, 
give it a new lease on life.   And third,  we will have to engage with a new “clientele” — a 
different set of relationships to study, a different audience to direct our findings to.  If we 
can help that new clientele to  understand how unequal  power affects their lives, and if 
we can propose fair and practical responses to the abuses of power they’re 
experiencing,  conceivably we will enhance both the reputation of our discipline and its 
social utility.     
 
Note:  I’ve said nothing so far about gaining influence, nothing about how in our new 
incarnation we might be able to nudge governments and  businesses towards greater 
fairness in economic relations across broad swathes of the economy.  To be honest, it’s 
highly unlikely that governments that have undermined  countervailing power for 
workers will  support countervailing power for farmers.  It’s improbable that governments 
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that  have allowed labour standards  to deteriorate in our workplaces will enact or 
enforce  legislation to protect tenants or consumers.  And in the current financial 
situation, it’s almost unthinkable that governments that have been cutting access to EI 
will invest in  pensions or drug plans.   In short, however compelling our evidence, 
however sound our recommendations, as things stand today if our research  
demonstrates  that markets have failed us and that market outcomes must be managed 
in the public interest, it is  likely to be ignored.   
 
But once again, I reach  back into the history of industrial relations.  Research can 
become influential, Daniel Rogers assures us,  if “the intellectual economy of 
catastrophe”  brings old ideas and institutions into disrepute and creates an appetite for  
new ideas and structures.   As he points out, this is precisely what happened during the 
Great Depression,  when  forty years of  research by John Commons and others —  
previously ignored in mainstream America — suddenly became  indispensable.  The 
architects of the New Deal used these studies — says Rogers —as a template to 
develop an array of urgent  reforms not only in industrial relations but across the whole 
of America’s wrecked economy.   The architects of the British welfare state did 
something similar in 1945.   Morley Gunderson reminded  us that the timeliness of 
research helps to determine its influence, and he was right.  But what he didn’t tell us is 
that timeliness is a ticking clock and influence  therefore a moving target.   Ideas are  
most likely to  be influential in the short term if  they are an easy sell, if  they reinforce  
the conventional wisdom,  slap fresh paint on  clapped-out public policies  and  give aid 
and comfort to the powerful.   But ideas  are most likely to be influential in the long term 
if they do the opposite: if they force  scholars and professionals to rethink their long-held 
views, show  hard-pressed governments how they can  make a constructive new start 
and remind those with power that if they don’t exercise it responsibly and fairly, they are 
likely to lose it.    
 
One can make a very good case that research should be driven by intellectual, social  
or moral imperatives, not  by the desire for influence.  But today I’m not making that 
case.   I’m making the case for the re-invention of IR so that it will indeed be fit for 
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purpose  at the historical moment when the need for it becomes both obvious and 
urgent. That moment might arrive tomorrow or ten or twenty years from now. But there 
will come a moment when we have all had enough of unstable markets, lopsided power 
relations, widespread unfairness and declining living standards.  When that moment 
arrives,  IR scholars who have enrolled in the new discipline of economic power and 
resistance will become very influential indeed — and useful as well.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
